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than the adjudication of interests in tangible goods, wherein states may cut off
nonresidents' interests with no actual notification.33 Furthermore, witnesses to
transactions between nonresidents and residents are more likely to live in the
state which the nonresident entered.
It would be difficult for corporations or individuals to defend in distant juris-
dictions where they might have no agents, office, or other organization. But if
the Maryland type of jurisdiction were to be sustained, the courts would still
retain their discretionary power on pleas of forum non conveniens to prevent
hardship on nonresident defendants. 34 This basis for jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents might increase their costs of defense, for it can be foreseen that a good-
sized, active corporation or other business would possibly be forced to defend
many claims in various jurisdictions. The hardship would certainly not be
greater, however, than that which arises from the well-established right to sue
a corporation doing business in the forum upon causes of action which are totally
unconnected with it. In addition, it seems reasonable to require the public to
share the social cost 3s of enterprise by paying higher prices for the goods and
services produced by businesses operating across state boundaries.36
This system of jurisdiction would leave unsolved the problem of protecting
nonresidents from plaintiffs who obtain default judgments on unfounded
claims, which the nonresident considers not worthy of defending. It does not
resolve the difficulty of the successful plaintiff who finds that the defendant
has no property within the jurisdiction. But it probably is simpler and less ex-
pensive for such plaintiffs to enforce judgments in another jurisdiction than it
is to travel to other jurisdictions to try their cases upon the merits.
In view of the large volume of enterprise carried on across state boundaries
the future may see increasing state jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
under statutes similar to the Maryland statute construed in Johns v. Bay State
Abrasive Products Co., consistent, of course, with the constitutional doctrine set
out in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.37
ACCESS PROBLEMS IN STRATIFIED ESTATE.
Division of the earth's subsurface into separate strata of ownership has
raised special problems in the law of property. One type of controversy results
33 Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944); Security Savings Bank v.
California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
34 In Leet v. Union Pacific R. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 155 P. 2d 42 (i944), cert. denied 325
U.S. 866 (1945), the court described forum non conveniens as being an equitable rule embracing
the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction which it has over a cause
of action where it believes that the action maybe more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere.
35 Social cost being the cost of adjudicating claims between residents and enterprises resi-
dent in distant jurisdictions.
36 Adopting in part the rationale given by Justice Douglas for the existence in our law of
vicarious liability without fault in his article Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk,
38 Yale L.J. 584 (1929).
37 326 U.S. 31o (1945).
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from the conveyance of subterranean coal without a reservation of access to
'the estate below. When the grantor has later sought to drill through the coal,
the courts have been faced with these opposing interests: the coal owner's
desire to receive the unencumbered property he has bargained for; and the
surface owner's claim that his retained estate beneath the coal should not be
withdrawn from use. The latter interest has generally carried the day, but the
reasoning and remedy employed have varied.
In the leading case of Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon' there were advanced
two of the doctrines relied upon in this field. The coal owner bad sought to
enjoin the surface owner's lessee from drilling through the coal to the oil be-
neath. Looking at the importance of the oil and gas industries to the economy
of Pennsylvania, the court concluded that such a valuable estate should not
be withdrawn from exploitation, and denied the injunction. A concurring
opinion2 placed the decision on a much broader basis, stating that since the
need of access to a lower stratum was as much the work of nature as the need
of support to an upper stratum, the earth's strata should be considered sub-
ject to "reciprocal servitudes" of access and support.3 The opinions differed in
another respect. The former considered that the coal owner would still have a
remedy at law;4 the latter did not see how the exercise of a right of access could
subject its owner to damages. However, they joined in rejecting the trial court's
reasoning that the surface owner had a way of necessity to the estate below
the coal.s
Nevertheless, in the recent case of Pyramid Coal Co. v. Pratt' the way of
necessity doctrine was employed to deny access to water. The coal under a
twenty-five acre tract had been conveyed to the defendant's predecessor in
title. The surface owner then subdivided, conveying two acres to the plaintiff
who drilled a well to obtain water for domestic use. Twelve years later the
defendant in mining the coal removed part of the casing, and the subdivision
owner sued for damages. Applying the rule that the necessity must exist at
x 52 Pa. 286, 25 At]. 597 (1893). 2 Ibid., at 299 and 6oo.
3 This solving phrase has influenced later opinions, e.g., Telford v. Jennings Products Co.,
2o3 Fed. 456 (C.A. 7th, 1913); Chartiers Oil Co. v. Curtiss, 34 Ohio C.C. io6 (1911). In 3
Lindley on Mines § 827 (3d ed., 1914), the author states: "This concurring opinion 'snaps like a
whip.' Its force and logic are irresistible." But consult Simonton, Ways by Necessity, 25 Col.
L. Rev. 571, 592 (1925), for an effective criticism of the "reciprocal servitudes" approach.
4 It is curious to note that the first decision in this field, Jefferson Iron Works v. Gill
Brothers, 9 Ohio Dec. 481 (1885), contemplated a directly opposite result. Using irreparable
damage as a basis, the court enjoined drilling for gas because of the dangers which would result
from its escape into the mine, but stated that should the injury be direct only (as in the case
of water), the coal owner would have adequate remedy at law.
Since this case, fears of escaping gas have been largely discounted. Consult concurring
opinion in Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, 302, 25 Atl. 597, 6oi (1893).
s The court in Chartiers Oil Co. v. Curtiss, 34 Ohio C.C. io6 (I9ii), while admitting an
analogy, also denied that the way of necessity doctrine could be applied to the subsurface
without modification. See note 7 infra.
6 92 N.E. 2d 858 (Ind. App., 195o), noted 36 Va. L. Rev. 96o (95o), 12 U. of Pitt. L. Rev.
1i9 (1950).
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the time of the severing of the servient from the dominant estate, the court
denied relief because the plaintiff had not proved that the original twenty-five
acre tract was entirely cut off from the water by the coal.7 It made dear, how-
ever, that such proof would not be required in the case of oil or gas.,
The application of the surface doctrine of way of necessity to subsurface
conveyances seems an unfortunate extension. In surface cases, necessity is
readily ascertainable, while the cost of test drilling or other geological inspec-
tion in order to determine whether the water can be reached without passing
through the coal may well prove prohibitive.
Furthermore, there has developed the rationale that surface necessity does
not create the way but merely supplies evidence of the intent of the parties.9
There may be times when this reasoning is appropriate. But evidence that no
way was intended has on occasion been disregarded, ° and the averment that
7 Under the surface way of necessity doctrine, if an isolated estate has ever been a part of
a larger estate bordering on a public way, then in the conveyance severing this estate there
is implied a way over the intervening land to the highway. The unity of ownership of the
dominant and servient estates is essential. Bullard v. Harrison, 4 M. & S. 387 (1915); Tracy v.
Atherton, 35 Vt. 52 (1862); Ellis v. Blue Mountain Forrest Ass'n, 69 N.H. 385, 41 Atl. 856
(i898). That the isolation arise from the conveyance, and not from subsequent events, is also
necessary. Van Patten v. Loof, 349 Ill. 483, 182 N.E. 628 (1932); Cornell-Andrews Smelting
Co. v. Boston & Providence R. Corp., 202 Mass. 585, 89 N.E. :i18 (igog). Where isolation is the
result of later transactions by one of the parties, it simply makes sense not to relieve him of
the consequences of his own action at the expense of another. See Botsford v. Wallace, 69
Conn. 263, 37 Atl. 902 (1897); Kentucky Distillers & Warehouse Co. v. Warwick, i66 Ky. 65I,
179 S.W. 6ii (1915); Richards v. Attleborough Branch R. Co., 153 Mass. 120, 26 N.E. 418
(i89i). This occurs where one of the owners has subdivided, leaving a portion of his estate
with no access. Accordingly, while the use of an existing way of necessity may be increased by
subdivision, original or additional ways are not created thereby. Burling v. Leiter, 272 Mich.
448, 262 N.W. 388 (1935); see Lankin v. Terwilliger, 22 Ore. 97, 29 Pac. 268 (1892); United
States v. Rindge, 2o8 Fed. 6ii (S.D. Cal., 1913).
The rule with respect to subdivision of the surface seems proper because it does not operate
to withdraw an estate from use. The same cannot be said of its application to the subsurface,
as the Pyramid Coal Co. case demonstrates.
8 Within the doctrine of way of necessity there is no basis for a dictinction between water
and oil or gas. In the case of the latter, the surface owner usually seeks to drill several wells,
and it has been felt that the frequent statement that only one way of necessity will be granted
renders necessity theory inapplicable to oil and gas. See Chartiers Oil Co. v. Curtiss, 34 Ohio
C.C. io6 (i911). However, it seems safe to say that this rule has never been laid down in a
surface case in which use of the whole dominant estate required more than one way. In Nichols
v. Luce, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 102 (1834), the court recognized that division of the dominant estate
by a cliff would lead to more than one way of necessity.
9 See, e.g., Nichols v. Luce, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 102 (1834); Collins v. Prentice, i5 Conn. 38
(1842); Carmon v. Dick, 170 N.C. 305, 87 S.E. 224 (1915).
-X Where the dominant owner obtained access by passing over the land of a stranger, thus
failing to assert a way of necessity, the courts have treated this as an express easement, not to
be lost by mere non-user. Finn v. Williams, 376 Ill. 95, 33 N.E. 2d 226 (1941); Adams v.
Hodgkins, io9 Me. 361, 84 Atl. 530 (1912). When the dominant owner has been granted access
for a limited purpose, way of necessity has been employed to give him another for a broader
use. Myers v. Dunn, 49 Conn. 71 (i88i); Uhl v. Ohio River R. Co., 47 W. Va. 59, 34 S.E. 934
(1889); cf. Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 41 A. 2d 66 (i944); Contra: Haskell v. Wright,
23 N.J. Eq. 389 (1873); cf. Baldwin Lumber Co. v. Todd, 124 La. 543, 50 So. 526 (igog);
Greek v. Wylie, 266 Pa. i8, io9 Atl. 529 (1920).
For an argument that parol evidence should not be admitted to rebut the presumption of
intent, see Evidence of Intent As Rebutting Ways of Necessity, 29 Yale L.J. 665 (1920).
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the way is implied purely through a fiction of law in order that no estate be
withdrawn from use- seems a more realistic exposition of the true rationale.
It is likely that the doctrine of surface way of necessity has been carried to the
point where, without compensation to the servient owner, it operates oppres-
sively. This objection is doubly cogent in subsurface conveyances, where intent
is almost invariably absent. Frequently the parties have disregarded the estate
below the coal because its value appeared inconsequential at the time of the
conveyance; the presence of oil or gas may not have been known, nor the need
for water apparent. In such cases perhaps the best compromise would be to
allow the surface owner to drill, but require him to compensate the coal owner
for the resulting injury to his estate, as suggested by the court in the Chartiers
Coal case.
This solution would demand an unusual exercise of judicial initiative, in
view of the constitutional requirement that private property shall not be taken
except for "public use."' 2 However, this prohibition has been circumvented in
similar situations. Legislation in many states has provided for eminent domain
proceedings for private benefit, and in holding them constitutional most courts
have been willing to relax the "public use" requirement to the vanishing point.x3
A purely judicial development has been the doctrine of "balancing the equi-
ties." While equity should grant an injunction against the invasion of a clear
property right, it has in some cases refused to do so where the resulting hard-
ship to the dominant owner would greatly exceed the benefit to the servient
owner, the latter being remitted to his remedy at law.14
11 See Buss v. Dyer, 125 Mass. 287 (1878); Hawley v. Chaffee, 88 Vt. 468,93 Ati. 120 (1914).
Accord: Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 41 A. 2d 66 (i944). In Crotty v. New River & Poca-
hontas Consolidated Coal Co., 72 W. Va. 68, 78 S.E. 233 (1913), the court went so far as to dis-
regard one of the fixed rules. After going back almost one hundred years to find unity of owner-
ship, it implied the grant of a way to a public road not existent at that time.
12 "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
Const. Amend. 5. There is a negative implication that private property shall not be taken for
private use, regardless of compensation.
1s Consult Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L.
Rev. 615 (i94o); The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58
Yale L.J. 599 (I949). One method of evasion is the view that it is sufficient that the public
have a theoretical right to use the property taken. Nichols, op. cit. supra, at 621-22. Con-
struction of a private road has also been approved on the ground that it enabled its user to
leave his home to vote and serve on juries. Robinson v. Swope, 12 Bush. (Ky.) 21 (1876);
Brewer v. Bowman, 9 Ga. 37 (i85o). State constitutions providing that exploitation of re-
sources is a public use have been upheld by the Supreme Court. Clark v. Nash, i98 U.S. 361
(i9o5); O'Neill v. Learner, 239 U.S. 244 (1915); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co.,
200 U.S. 527 (19o6).
'4 Consult McClintock, Discretion to Deny Injunction Against Trespass and Nuisance,
12 Minn. L. Rev. 565 (1928); for an argument in favor of the extension of this doctrine, see
Keeton and Morris, Notes on "Balancing the Equities," i8 Texas L. Rev. 4x2 (194o). The
principal application has been in cases of innocent encroachment by the building of an adjoin-
ing landowner. E.g., Lynch v. Union Institute for Savings, 159 Mass. 3o6,34 N.E. 364 (1893);
Methodist Episcopal Society v. Akers, 167 Mass. 560,46 N.E. 381 (1897); Crocker v. Manhat-
tan Life Ins. Co., 61 App. Div. 226, 7o N.Y. Supp. 492 (ist Dep't, igoI). Here the courts are
often motivated by a reluctance to help a plaintiff who is simply trying to make a good thing of
his rights. See Lynch v. Union Institute for Savings, supra; Hunter v. Carroll, 64 N.H. 572, 15
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In the situation of the principal case, with no judicial equivalent of an emi-
nent domain procedure available to alleviate the necessity of finding that the
surface owner has either an unqualified right or no right at all to drill through
the coal,5 it is not strange to find the Indiana court resorting to an arbitrary
distinction between water and oil or gas in its attempt to balance the competing
interests. The court was unwilling to give general application to a rationale
evoked by a concern for the oil and gas industries of Pennsylvania 6-the
equivalent of finding for the surface owner in Pyramid Coal Co. v. Pratt.
"PUBLIC INTEREST" AND THE MARKET IN COLOR
TELEVISION REGULATION*
Color television is not a new idea in the history of television and the problem
had been before the Federal Communications Commission as early as 1940.
The Commission considered various color television systems in public hearings
in 1941, 1944-45, and between December 3, 1946 and February 13, 1947, but
refused to adopt commercial standards for any of the systems demonstrated
because they were unsatisfactory., On July ii, 1949 the Commission issued a
notice of further proposed rule-making relative to color television. 2 The color
television systems which the Commission proposed to examine had to meet
two criteria: (i) that they operate in a six megacycle channel and (2) that the
pictures could be received on existing black and white television receivers
Atl. 17 (1888); Tramonte v. Colarusso, 256 Mass. 299, 152 N.E. 90 (1926). The doctrine has
not been extended to intentional, or negligent, crossing of property lines. Curtis Mfg. Co. v.
Spencer Wire Co., 203 Mass. 448, 89 N.E. 534 (i909); Szathmary v. Boston & A. R. Co., 214
Mass. 42, oo N.E. 1107 (i9o3); Kershishian v. Johnson, 210 Mass. 135, 96 N.E. 56 (ig91).
In other cases of intentional trespass, where the loss to the defendant would be exceptional
and that to the plaintiff negligible, equity has denied an injunction. Crescent Mining Co. v.
Silver King Mining Co., 17 Utah 444, 54 Pac. 244 (1898); McCann v. Chasm Power Co.,
211 N.Y. 3ox, 1o5 N.E. 416 (i1Q4).
1- For "balancing the equities" to be applicable, the coal owner would have to be seeking an
injunction against drilling by the surface owner. Even then the doctrine has not been em-
ployed where there was substantial injury caused by intentional trespass. Barker v. Mintz,
73 Colo. 262, 215 Pac. 534 (1923), and Whiles v. Grand Junction Mining & Fuel Co., 86 Colo.
418, 282 Pac. 26o (1929) relied upon a statute which provided that a surface owner could
enjoin the mineral owner from mining unless the latter gave the former a bond to secure him
against injury.
16 In Pennsylvania Central Brewing Co. v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 250 Pa. 300, 95 Atl.
471 (191S), the Pennsylvania court did extend the Chartiers Coal decision to subterranean
water.
I FCC, First Report of Commission, Color Television Issues, 7-21 (195o) (mimeo-
graphed). (The First Report of Commission, Color Television Issues will hereinafter be cited
as "First Report.")
' FCC, Television Broadcast Service, Notice of Further Proposed Rule Making, 14 Fed.
Reg. 4483 (ig4g).
* Since this issue went to press, the Supreme Court has handed down its decision in the
current case. Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 19 U.S. L.W. 4337 (May 29, 1951).
As suggested in this Comment the lower court decision was affirmed. Justice Frankfurter
dissented on substantive grounds.
